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Ectopia 
Income tax law generally taxes the results of legal 
transactions rather than their underlying economic effect. The 
courts often tell us that tax law does not tax on the basis of 
economic equivalence.3 But the problem is deeper. In order to 
make income tax work at all, the law must make a number of 
assumptions that are not in fact correct, assumptions as to 
both the factual and the legal nature of the taxpayer’s income. 
The effect of these assumptions is that the base that the law 
taxes becomes removed from the facts of the case. 
                                                  
1 This paper has been developed from a theme introduced in “Income 
Taxation: a Structure Built on Sand”, the inaugural Ross Parsons 
Memorial Lecture, delivered by the author at Sydney University in June 
2001. It repeats some material, particularly introductory passages, from 
that lecture. 
2 BA, LLB (hons) (Auckland); BCL (Oxon); JSD (Cornell); Inner Temple. 
Professor and former Dean of Law at Victoria University, Wellington, 
New Zealand. www.vuw.acc.nz/~prebble. 
3 Eg Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd [1971] 
NZLR 641, 648 PC. 
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I have written several articles on this phenomenon,4 which 
I call “ectopia”. “Ectopia” means “displacement” or 
“dislocation”. 
The fundamental difficulty is that we cannot have an 
income tax without a concept of income. For a number of 
reasons, our concept of income must be artificial. Tax law’s 
concept of income is not the fact of income itself but a legal 
simulacrum of income. The separation of income tax law 
from its subject matter can be seen best in the law’s efforts to 
tax business profits. Business profits arise independently of 
the law, and sometimes even in spite of the law. They are not 
a result even of contract law, let alone of tax law. They are the 
result of people’s economic transactions with one another. 
Income tax law cannot tax economic transactions directly. 
Rather, it taxes the legal forms that we use to represent 
economic transactions.5  
People may challenge this analysis by saying that, apart 
from the wholly exceptional case of honour clauses,6 business 
profits are in fact always derived within legal frameworks. 
Business people may talk mostly about prices, goods, and 
services, but their transactions are in fact able to be analysed 
in terms of contracts, leases, trusts, companies, and so on. 
Moreover, that picture is not a matter of chance. Business 
people generally ensure that they pay attention to the legal 
                                                  
4 “Ectopia, formalism, and anti-avoidance rules in income tax law” (1994) 
in W. Krawietz N. MacCormick & G.H. von Wright (eds) Prescriptive 
Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, 
Festschrift for Robert S. Summers, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 367-
383; “Philosophical and design problems that arise from the ectopic nature 
of income tax law and their impact on the taxation of international trade 
and investment”, (1995) 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and 
Affairs, 111-139, reprinted as “Ectopia, tax law, and international 
taxation” [1997] British Tax Review 383; “Can income tax law be 
simplified?” (1996) 2 NZ Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187; 
“Should tax legislation be written from a principles and purpose point of 
view of a precise and detailed point of view?” [1998] British Tax Review 
112; see also “Why is tax law incomprehensible?” (1994) BTR 380-393. 
5 Exceptionally among common law jurisdictions, the United States of 
America tries to circumvent this problem by employing a substance-over-
form approach in tax cases. Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935). The 
United States has not always managed to maintain this approach. See, eg, 
the cases known as the “Mexican railcar cases”, such as Chicago, 
Burlington, & Quincy R Co v United States, 455 F. 2d 993 (Ct Cl 1972) 
and Missouri Pacific Railroad Co v United States, 497 F. 2d 1386 (Ct Cl 
1974). For a recent discussion and references, see P.A. Glicklich and M.J. 
Miller “Appeals Court adheres to precedent, tells IRS that it’s too late to 
issue regulations” in Glicklich & SH Goldberg, Selected US Tax 
Developments, newsletter of Roberts & Holland LLP, New York, (2001). 
6 See, eg, Rose & Frank Ltd v Crompton Bros  [1923] 2 KB 261, reversed 
[1925] AC 445. 
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implications of their transactions, if only in case things go 
wrong. 
All this is true, but history demonstrates that profits are 
independent of the law. In Anglo-Saxon times, it was 
impossible to enforce any contracts at all, except contracts of 
betrothal. Even in the case of betrothal, if a man reneged on 
his engagement the bride’s family did not turn to the courts 
for help. To mark the engagement, the family had confirmed 
the promise by taking from the groom a wed, which was a 
valuable object, handed over as a pledge. Grooms who failed 
to appear at their weddings forfeited their weds. 
The position did not change much for hundreds of years. It 
was not until 1602 in Slade’s7 case that the common law 
began to enforce executory contracts. But throughout this 
entire time people continued to make business profits,8 profits 
that in principle could have been subject to income tax. That 
is, history reveals the obvious point that profits, the subject 
matter of income taxation, arise from transactions, not from 
the law. Nevertheless, it is the legal substance of transactions 
that the law taxes, not the underlying economic substance. 
Often, perhaps even usually, these two substances coincide. 
Nevertheless, they are different. The legal substance of a 
transaction is a simulacrum of its economic substance, a 
likeness that often diverges from its original. 
This is the first reason for the dislocation between income 
tax law and the economic profits that are its substance. Other 
reasons include the problem of place and the problem of time. 
The problem of place arises in connection with 
international transactions. Income tax law assumes that all 
income can be located in one jurisdiction or another as a 
matter of physical fact, or, as Isaacs J put it, as “a hard, 
practical matter of fact”9. Almost any example of an 
international transaction will dispel this assumption. Where is 
the source of the profit that a multi-national company makes 
on selling a computer to a retail buyer in Sydney? In one 
                                                  
7 4 Co Rep 91a. 
8 This paragraph slightly overstates the case, but not in a way that detracts 
from its basic thesis. In Anglo-Saxon times, apart from betrothals it was 
also possible to enforce a promise to appear at court to answer the claims 
of a plaintiff, achieved as with betrothals by taking security. For some 
periods of history people could enforce mercantile contracts in the courts 
of fairs and boroughs or “piepowder” courts. Many standard texts on the 
law of contract, such as the various editions of Cheshire & Fifoot, Law of 
Contract, begin with an historical introduction that includes references 
works on the history of contract in the common law. 
9 Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183, 189–
190. 
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sense the question makes no sense. Profit is a net concept, the 
difference between receipts and expenditure. A difference 
cannot exist physically in space. 
From another point of view the question makes a little 
more sense, in that a fraction of the multi-national company’s 
profit comes, no doubt, from activity at each of its 
manufacturing plants, its head office, its despatch department, 
its marketing department and its treasury administration, to 
name only some of the more obvious profit centres. However, 
anyone with the barest acquaintance with transfer pricing 
rules and practices will appreciate that dividing profit among 
these centres is an inexact process that uses surrogates for 
truth rather than the underlying truth itself. 
Problems of residence are just as bad as problems of 
source. That is especially true of problems of corporate 
residence. For tax systems to work, companies must be made 
to reside somewhere, but the whole concept of corporate 
residence is artificial. We can think of a company in a number 
of ways: as a pile of papers in a filing cabinet; as a collection 
of people who are shareholders, albeit often living in different 
countries; as a congeries of contracts that is reduced to a 
constitution or memorandum and articles; or as an inchoate 
legal person through which shareholders interact with third 
parties. But whichever way we look at it, to say that a 
company resides anywhere involves a metaphor. 
These problems of source and residence are endemic in a 
world where taxing jurisdictions are defined by reference to 
geographical facts, that is, by reference to national borders on 
a map. To cope with companies one must operate as if the 
fiction of corporate residence were a fact. To cope with 
profits, one must attribute a fictional physical source to 
income. That is the problem of place in a nutshell. 
The problem of time is worse. Ideally, we would wait for a 
business to go through its whole life, from foundation to 
liquidation, before determining whether there had been profits 
and, if so, how much they were. Of course, tax systems, like 
shareholders, cannot wait that long; so, like accountants, tax 
authorities require businesses to divide their lives into periods 
delimited by dates. We always use twelve months, but there is 
no special reason for this convention apart from convenience. 
One result is that Parliament must legislate so that receipts 
and expenses are treated not as the taxpayer actually meets 
them, but as they might have occurred had they been spread 
evenly over time. Income smoothing for farmers is a good 
example. Another result is that, to reduce tax, people try to 
accelerate expenses and to defer receipts. In response, 
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Parliament treats receipts and expenses as if they arose at 
times different from when they arose in law. For instance, for 
tax purposes, the law may spread interest paid on day one of a 
long-term loan over the duration of the loan. The policy of 
such a rule is to reflect the true economic position, but the 
result is that tax law treats interest as paid at times that are 
different from the times when it was paid in fact and in law.  
These problems of timing show how tax law must distort 
facts and law in order to operate. The major problem that 
relates to time is the distinction between capital and revenue. 
An annual taxing system must have this distinction, but the 
distinction causes capital and revenue to be treated 
differently, even though they are essentially fungible, with all 
the consequences that we know. 
None of this is to criticise Parliament’s response. 
Parliament cannot allow clever people to accelerate income or 
to create contrived interest deductions. If Parliament must 
create and tax a simulacrum of interest payments rather than 
actual interest payments that is understandable. It is probably 
even a good thing. The point is more fundamental. It is that an 
income tax system cannot work without such pretences. 
Criticisms of the ectopia thesis 
I have tried to explain the thesis that income tax law is 
different in kind from most other law because of the 
dislocation between income tax law and the facts to which it 
relates. People have responded with three criticisms or 
questions, which are directed to suggesting that income tax 
law is not so very unusual. The questions are first, are not the 
rules of accountancy similar in character to the rules of 
income taxation? Secondly, is the apparent uniqueness of 
income tax law not just a matter of requiring more detail, in 
the sense that legislators could make rules for all the different 
possibilities of income taxation if they wished? That is, one 
might argue that if there is a difference between tax law and 
other law it is essentially a matter of degree rather than kind. 
More densely woven legislation would demonstrate the point 
should legislators choose to go down that path. Thirdly, the 
law is well used to fictions. Are not the assumptions that give 
us our concept of income just examples of legal fictions? Dr 
Alex Frame suggests that the concept of ectopia appears to be 
essentially the same as that of the fiction understood 
sufficiently widely.10 Is he correct? I shall attempt to answer 
these questions first generally and then individually. 
                                                  
10 Alex Frame “Fictions in the Thought of Sir John Salmond” (1990) 30 
VUWLR 159, 168 n 26. 
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Regarding the matter in general, I have made the point a 
number of times that it is a characteristic of law as an 
institution to enjoy an almost symbiotic relationship with its 
subject matter. When sovereigns legislate, they make sure that 
their laws relate as closely as possible to the subject matter of 
those laws, if only for efficiency. A sovereign who wants to 
forbid assault does not create an offence of consensual 
hugging, at least not intentionally. But a sovereign who wants 
to tax the profits of hire purchase transactions efficiently may 
pass a law that pretends that hire purchase transactions are 
credit sales. Section FC 10 of the New Zealand Income Tax 
Act 1994 is such a provision. 
Factually, such a law does not involve pretence at all. Hire 
purchase transactions are indeed fundamentally credit sales. 
Retailers construct their sales as hire purchases not to change 
the basic nature of the transactions but in order to keep title to 
their goods against the possibility of buyer default. All section 
FC 10 does is to tax such transactions according to their 
economic effect rather than according to their legal form. 
Take another example. A sovereign that wants to tax the 
world-wide income of a resident may pass controlled foreign 
company legislation that says that income of a company in 
another country is the income of the resident.11 To some 
people, such a rule is a jurisprudential anathema; to a tax 
economist it seems an obvious measure. 
Accountancy 
I turn to the three questions or criticisms. First, it is true that 
accountancy must grapple with exactly the same problems of 
timing as must income tax. Should receipts or expenses be 
recognised all at once, or should they be spread? Should we 
have a concept of capital to deal with matters of a particularly 
long-term nature? On the face of it, accountancy seems to 
respond to these sorts of questions in the same manner as tax 
law. For instance, like law, accountancy must divide the life 
of a business into artificial intervals and must force receipts 
and expenses into those intervals whether they fit well or not. 
Secondly, law and accountancy share the same basic policy: 
to measure profits. 
Nevertheless, the response of accountancy is different from 
the response of income tax law. Despite its apparent 
formality, accountancy has an overriding requirement to reach 
the factual substance of things, whereas for income taxation 
the goal is legal substance. If generally accepted principles of 
accountancy lead to a picture that is incorrect in substance, 
                                                  
11 Eg Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s CG 1. 
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then, at least in principle, accountants who are trying to 
calculate the profits of an enterprise either should follow 
different rules or should add explanatory notes to their 
accounts. That is, at least in principle the rules of accountancy 
are flexible enough to accommodate all the different varieties 
of business experience that accountants may be asked to 
record. Income tax law is different, in that it allows only one 
correct answer, and only one route to that answer. Further, the 
answer is the answer that emerges from taxing a legal 
simulacrum, which may not be the answer that financial 
economics would reach. 
Let me illustrate by an example. Suppose a shipping 
company starts business under-capitalised. It copes with the 
problem by chartering its ships on balloon leases, that is, 
leases where the rent starts low and increases from year to 
year. The result will be that in year one profits will be higher 
than they would have been had the leases provided for flat 
rate payments. Accurate accounts for the company should 
note that part of the cost of the first year has been deferred to 
future years, and should make provision for that cost; but 
income tax will simply assess the apparent profit, and that 
will be that. My point is that at least in principle accountancy 
endeavours to record the true substance of business, whereas 
income tax assesses an apparent profit that may be some 
distance removed from the true profit. 
This difference between tax law and accountancy is 
sometimes masked by apparent over-formality on the part of 
accountants. This over-formality occasionally emerges as an 
entertaining by-product of judgments in tax cases. For 
instance, both FCT v Myer Emporium Ltd12 and AA Finance 
Ltd v CIR13 had their origins in stratagems designed to 
circumvent limits on borrowing powers that earlier lenders 
had imposed on the companies in question. Clever 
accountants had devised schemes of a circumventing nature 
that, in each case, involved the taxpayer selling financial 
assets. Tax people are interested in the cases because the 
courts held the sales to be on revenue account, but in the 
present context one’s interest in the schemes is different. It 
arises from the fact that the companies were able to persuade 
auditors who represented the interests of the earlier lenders 
that these schemes (which had no obvious substantive effect) 
did in fact allow the companies to circumvent borrowing 
limitations. 
                                                  
12 (1987)18 ATR 693 HC. 
13 (1994) 19 TRNZ 133 CA. 
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Despite the story of the Myer and AA Finance cases, to 
conclude that accountancy is as formalistic as tax law is to be 
misled. Accountancy aims to reflect substance, but sometimes 
allows accountants to follow rules that lead to a formalistic 
rather than substantive result. That is, accountancy sometimes 
follows permissive rules that permit accounts to diverge from 
economic truth. Tax law, on the other hand, is obliged to 
operate according to mandatory rules that sometimes require 
accounts to diverge from economic truth. The irony is the tax 
law took the accounting legerdemain in both the Myer and AA 
Finance cases seriously and, in each case, taxed a profit that 
did not exist in economic terms. 
General and specific rules 
Secondly, is the apparent problem of ectopia simply a result 
of the rules of tax law being too general? Could enacting 
increasingly detailed rules that would reflect all of the many 
facets of modern business solve the problem? The answer is 
no, for two reasons. First, some aspects of income tax law are 
truly irrational. It would not be possible to enact detailed rules 
that would be both comprehensive in coverage and consistent 
with one another. Take, for instance, the simple example of 
private investors who own portfolios of corporate shares that 
are pregnant with profits. If the investors sell the shares the 
receipt is capital; if they take the dividend the receipt is 
income. Modern income tax laws mitigate the irrationality 
with imputation systems and capital gains taxes, but they 
cannot dispel it. 
My second response to the argument that the dislocation of 
income tax law could be remedied by greater detail in 
legislation is an analogy with science. These days, most of the 
great problems of science are solved, or, at least, people are 
well on the way to solving them. It is only a matter of time 
before someone reaches a unified theory for the forces of 
physics, and since the discovery of DNA biology has been 
transformed once and for all. The last great-uncharted field in 
science is human consciousness. We know very little about it, 
and there is no major breakthrough on the horizon.14 
In my analogy, law corresponds with science in general, 
and income tax law with the science of human consciousness. 
Law in general is rooted in the objective facts to which it 
relates, as physics and biology are nowadays rooted in proven 
fact. In contrast, income tax law hovers around the facts to 
which it relates, as the study of consciousness hovers around 
                                                  
14 Explanation from Lodge, David, Thinks … , (2001) London, Secker & 
Warburg, 35. 
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the brain. The novelist, David Lodge, has described the 
problem of consciousness in words that fit the problem of 
income tax law with remarkable aptness. Lodge says that the 
problem of consciousness is “How to give an objective, third-
person, account of a subjective, first-person, phenomenon.”15 
Income tax law relates to profits that emerge from 
transactions conducted between two or more individuals. How 
can income tax law give an objective account of these 
transactions to the state, which as a third person is 
independent of the transactions, but which as a taxing power 
is vitally interested in them? If my analogy is good, Lodge’s 
further elaboration of the problems of studying human 
consciousness offers little encouragement to people who 
might hope to bring income tax law closer to the reality of the 
tax base. Lodge explains that there are about one hundred 
billion neurones in the human brain, and there are more 
possible connections between them than there are atoms in the 
universe.16 The problems of income tax law can form only a 
small sub-set of these many inter-neurone connections, but 
they are certainly a subjective sub-set, in the sense that 
citizens are for the most part free to organise their commercial 
relationships how they choose, and free to construct the legal 
record of those relationships in whatever manner they like. 
There is a gap between these subjective relationships and the 
objective appraisal of the relationships that tax law must 
undertake. 
Fictions 
I’ll turn now to the third critical question, relating to legal 
fictions. My thesis is that the fictions of income tax law are of 
a different character from other legal fictions. I shall illustrate 
by considering several fictions from history. Roman law had 
many fictions. For instance the fictio Legis Corneliae 
addressed the problem of Romans dying in captivity. If a 
Roman was captured he lost his citizenship, and with it his 
capacity to make a valid testament. The Romans glossed the 
Lex Cornelia with a fiction that for succession purposes 
Roman citizens should be deemed to have died at the instant 
of capture, while still free men and citizens.17 
                                                  
15 Id 42. 
16 Id 52. 
17 Justinian The Institutes, translated and annotated and with commentary 
by T.C. Sandars, 7th ed (new impression) London 1962, 180. The Lex 
Cornelia de falsis (BC 81) provided the same penalty for forging the 
testament of a person dying in captivity as for forging the testament of 
someone dying in his own country. The law could not have intended to 
attach a penalty to forging a testament that was invalid. Accordingly, it 
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That is a fiction from Roman Law. Two fictions from the 
common law are the doctrines of trover and of attractive 
nuisance. When you sued someone for the return of your 
goods you pleaded that he had found them, even if the 
defendant had taken the goods by force. This pleading was to 
bring your claim within the form of action of trover and 
detinue, which did not allow for theft.18 The courts well knew 
what was going on and assumed the fictional fact that the 
defendant had indeed found the goods. 
My second common law example is the attractive 
nuisance. An attractive nuisance is something on your land 
that is dangerous but that attracts children to play on it. The 
common law said that you did not have to worry as the 
children were crushed under tons of falling scrap metal or had 
their limbs torn off by locomotive turntables that were out of 
control. You did not invite the children; they were trespassers 
and they got what was coming to them. Occasionally the 
courts found all this too robust and held that people leaving 
attractive but dangerous articles on their land must be taken to 
have issued an invitation to come in and play on those 
articles; so the maimed children were not trespassers, and the 
occupiers were liable.19 
The three fictions that I have mentioned share a common 
characteristic: by implication, they created rules that someone 
could have drafted expressly. Rome could have ruled that the 
wills of former citizens dying in captivity were valid. England 
could have created a form of action for suing a thief for one’s 
goods or could have passed a statute providing for a greater 
degree of liability on the part of occupiers, as in fact it did 
many years later.20 That these things did not happen, at least 
when they were first needed, and that the legal systems in 
question remedied the injustices by fictions, were functions of 
conservatism and of a wish to advance law reform slowly. 
They were not a result of any inherent difficulty in direct 
reform of the laws in question. 
The fictions of income tax law are very different. The 
classic legal fiction entails pretence, but taxation fictions 
entail duplicity. The pretence of the classic legal fiction is a 
vehicle to provide transport on the road to a just result, but the 
                                                                                                      
must be assumed that the deceased had the power of making a testament 
both when he in fact made it and when he died. 
18 Blackstone III Private Wrongs 152. 
19 See Sioux City & Pacific Rly Co v Stout (1873) 17 Wall. 657 (US SC), 
City of Pekin v McMahon 154 Ill 141 (1895), and United Zinc v Bruitt 258 
US 268, 275 (1921) per Holmes J. But see Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 
358 HL. 
20 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. 
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duplicity of a taxation fiction is part of the result itself. Let me 
illustrate. 
Rules that spread interest that is paid on day one over the 
life of a loan assume expressly or impliedly that the interest is 
paid at regular rests. Rules that attribute the income of foreign 
trustees or of foreign companies to Australian residents 
assume impliedly that the Australian residents in question 
indeed derive the income. 
Take a more complex example: the basic assumption of 
income tax law that there is a logical real-world distinction 
between capital and revenue is a fiction. There are 
innumerable pairs of cases that illustrate the flaws in that 
assumption, but I’ll use the classic teacher’s comparison 
between Californian Oil Products Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation21 on one hand and Heavy Minerals 
Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation22 on the other. In 
both cases, the business of the taxpayer was destroyed. Both 
taxpayers received compensation for the loss; but Californian 
Oil Products’ compensation was capital and Heavy Minerals’s 
compensation was revenue. Heavy Minerals was the later 
case; so the court had to distinguish Californian Oil Products. 
Windeyer J distinguished the earlier case by explaining that 
Californian’s business was destroyed as a matter of law, 
whereas Heavy Minerals’s business was destroyed only as a 
matter of fact. That analysis is correct from the point of view 
of a tax lawyer, but a tax payer could be forgiven for finding 
it unpersuasive. 
Californian’s problem was that its American principal, 
Union Oil Company, decided not to sell it any more oil, 
terminated Californian’s purchasing contract, and paid 
compensation. Heavy Minerals’s difficulty was that the world 
price of rutile fell below its cost of production. The company 
had protected itself against this eventuality by forward sales 
contracts, but its customers preferred to cancel the contracts 
and compensate Heavy Minerals for its loss of profits rather 
than to buy rutile from Heavy Minerals and sell it at a loss. 
In effect, Windyer J told Heavy Minerals that it could 
ignore these facts and proceed to mine rutile if it wanted to do 
so. There was no legal impediment. 
As I have explained, Windeyer J’s distinguishing of 
Californian Oil Products and his reasoning in Heavy Minerals 
were unexceptionable in law. The reason is that the High 
Court was not purporting to calculate Heavy Minerals’s tax 
liability on the basis of the profit from its actual economic 
                                                  
21 (1934) 52 CLR 28. 
22 (1966) 115 CLR 512. 
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business, but on the basis of the contracts that were used as 
the legal vehicle for that business and on the basis of the 
rights and duties that formed the legal context of the business. 
Sir Victor was correct that from a legal point of view Heavy 
Minerals’s business remained intact, even though nobody 
wanted rutile at the price that they had to charge. On the other 
hand, Californian Oil Products’s business had depended on a 
contractual right to buy products from Union Oil. Once that 
right was gone there was no legal basis for their business. 
All that sounds fine when you say it quickly, but it makes a 
nonsense of any policy of income tax law. In its most general 
sense, the policy of income tax law in respect of businesses 
must be to tax real business profits. Profits from economic 
activity exist in the natural world, but profits defined by law 
are a construction of human thought. Economic transactions 
constitute the only reality that a government can tax. Using 
profits defined by law as the vehicle to do the taxing does not 
change the underlying reality. 
Income tax law achieves its policy of taxing business 
profits by defining a surrogate of business profits in legal 
terms as best it can. In this respect, income tax law is an 
imperfect means to an end, because the definition of business 
profits can never be perfectly accurate. In fact, as I have tried 
to point out, the definition is often very inaccurate. The true, 
economic, business profit, which would be the proper subject 
of the tax base if we could ever get at it, is removed from its 
legal simulacrum by an ectopia. 
This is not to say that law and economics never coincide. 
They often do. One occasion was in the Californian Oil 
Products case. In reality, the business of the company was 
destroyed. The legal position exactly reflected that reality, 
because it was the cancellation of the contract with Union Oil 
that wrought the destruction. Thus, the legal position in 
Californian Oil Products was not a fiction. The problem for 
Heavy Minerals was that in its case factual reality and legal 
context parted company, leaving an ectopia between them. 
The point that I emphasise here is that this ectopia was not an 
occasional incident but an example of a fiction that is 
fundamental to income tax law (that is, the fiction that income 
tax law does in fact relate to the reality of its subject matter). 
This fiction is different from an ordinary legal fiction in that if 
we are to have a concept of income, and if we are to have a 
tax that operates on an annual basis, the tax must assume that 
the fiction is true. 
If it chooses, tort law can redraft itself so as to operate 
without the fiction of inviting children to enter premises and 
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play on dangerous turntables. Indeed, it did so in several 
Occupiers’ Liability Acts in the 1950s and ’60s.23 But income 
tax law cannot abandon the fiction of a logical and factual 
boundary between capital and revenue. 
History 
The courts have grappled with the distinction between capital 
and revenue for decades, and will no doubt continue to do so. 
Early cases attempted to assess tax on the basis of economic 
fact rather than of legal fact. Viscount Haldane said in Sun 
Insurance Office v Clark:24 “[I]t is plain that the question of 
what is or is not profit or gain must primarily be one of fact, 
and of fact to be ascertained by the tests applied in ordinary 
business”. In Riches v The Westminster Bank Ltd,25 Lord 
Wright said, “The distinction [between capital and income] 
depends on substance, not on mere name.” In context, it is 
clear that his Lordship was referring to economic substance, 
not to legal substance. 
In the same case, Lord Simmonds, said, “But the real 
question is still what is [a receipt’s] intrinsic character, and in 
the consideration of this question a description due to the 
authority under which it is paid may well mislead”.26 That is, 
Lord Simmonds distinguished factual, or intrinsic, reality 
from legal reality in holding that the question of whether a 
payer is authorised to pay does not necessarily determine 
whether what is paid is “interest”. 
Nowadays, this sort of reasoning is consigned to history. In 
Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd v CIR,27 Lord Diplock explained that in 
this context, “reality” is “directed only to the legal character 
of the payment and not to its economic consequences”. 
Lord Diplock’s words are undoubtedly good law, but they 
are not calculated to achieve precision in executing the policy 
of income taxation, to tax business profits. As has been 
explained, there is a gap between legal reality and economic 
reality. To tax legal reality rather than economic reality may 
perhaps be thought of as taxing by fiction, but the fiction is 
different in kind from what is usually meant by a legal fiction. 
                                                  
23 Eg Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (England), Occupiers’ Liability 
(Scotland) Act 1960, Occupiers’ Liability Act 1962 (New Zealand). 
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25 [1947[ AC 390, 403, [1947] 1 All ER 469, 474 HL. 
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Theory of fictions 
Lon Fuller, the great American jurist of the mid-20th century, 
identified several characteristics of legal fictions.28  He said 
that fictions are like scaffolding. As the law develops we can 
abandon them without injuring the policy or vested interests 
that they are designed to sustain.29 In contrast, it is my thesis 
that the fictions of income tax law an integral part of the law’s 
modus operandi.  
Tourtoulon argued that “judicial theory is all the more 
objective when it presents itself as fictions, and all the more 
delusive when it claims to do without fictions”.30 Fuller 
agreed. He said, “A doctrine that is plainly fictitious must 
seek its justification in considerations of social and economic 
policy; a doctrine that is nonfictitious often has a spurious 
self-evidence about it”.31 That insight hardly applies to the 
fictions of income tax. For a start, judges often deny them. I 
have already mentioned Isaacs J’s remarks, which are an 
express denial that the concept of the source of income is a 
fiction.32 Windeyer J’s reasoning in Heavy Minerals is an 
implied denial that the company had gone out of business. In 
Fuller’s words, the whole doctrine of the capital/revenue 
boundary has a spurious self-evidence about it. For instance, 
the identifiable asset test saved the taxpayer in Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Carron Co,33 where the House of 
Lords held that expenditure on a company’s constitution, the 
single item that stays with it from incorporation to liquidation, 
was a matter of revenue. The same test sank the taxpayer in 
Tucker v Granada Motorway Services Ltd,34 where Lord 
Wilberforce denied a deduction for a payment to reduce the 
taxpayer’s rent because the payment was consideration for an 
alteration in a lease. These results are hardly dictated by 
considerations of economic and social policy, apart from the 
consideration that income tax law must operate somehow, and 
that this “somehow” necessarily entails a distinction between 
capital and revenue. 
The German philosopher, Vaihinger, posed a similar 
question to those of Tourtoulon and Fuller. He asked in his 
                                                  
28 Legal Fictions (Stanford, 1967). 
29 Id 70. 
30 Cited at idem, from Tourtoulon, Philosophy in the Development of Law 
(1922) 295. 
31 Legal Fictions (Stanford 1967) 71. I thank Dr Alex Frame, of 
Wellington, for drawing this monograph to my attention. 
32 Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183, 189–
190. 
33 1968 SC (HL) 47, 45 Tax Cas 18. 
34 [1979] 2 All ER 801 HL. 
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book, The Philosophy of As If, “How does it come about that 
with consciously false ideas we are yet able to reach 
conclusions that are right?”35 Vaihinger was referring to 
thinking in general rather than to law. For instance, most of 
the modern developments in atomic physics stem from people 
making calculations as if atoms were comprised of a number 
of particles with varying qualities. As it turns out, they 
probably are, but people did not know this at the beginning. 
Fuller points out that Vaihinger’s question is equally 
applicable to legal fictions because they help the law to 
develop towards the truth.36 On the other hand, as we have 
seen, the fundamental fictions of the concept of income are 
apt to lead us away from truth. 
Vaihinger explained that “The greatest and most important 
human errors originate through thought-processes being taken 
for copies of reality itself”.37 If we distinguish between law 
and fact, law, being a collection of norms, is a “thought-
process” while facts are reality. Business profits are an aspect 
of economic reality, but a legal simulacrum of business profits 
is not an exact copy of the underlying facts of those profits. 
Fuller expanded:38 
[T]hese constructs must be used as instruments of thought only; 
we must treat them as servants to be discharged as soon as they 
have fulfilled their functions. They are foreign elements which 
may be inserted into the equation provisionally to render the 
computation simpler, but which must be dropped from the final 
reckoning. 
Income tax law’s problem is that in the context of business 
profits it is itself a “foreign element”. We cannot drop it from 
the reckoning once it has fulfilled its function because it is the 
means of fulfilment. Income tax’s fictions are fictions, but not 
fictions as they are known in other parts of the law. 
Analeptic fictions 
It is useful to call such fundamental fictions of the concept of 
income “inherent fictions”, in that they are inherent in that 
concept. Fictions about source, residence, capital, revenue, 
and time in general are inherent fictions. As well as inherent 
fictions, income tax law is replete with what may be called 
analeptic, or remedial fictions. Most analeptic fictions in tax 
                                                  
35 Die Philosophie des Asl Ob (1911), quoted in L Fuller, Legal Fictions 
(Stanford 1967) 103. 
36 Idem. 
37 Quoted by Alex Frame in “Fictions in the Thought of Sir John 
Salmond” (1990) 30 VUWLR 159, 167 from Hans Vaihinger The 
Philosophy of As-if, trans C.K. Ogden (London 1924) 8. 
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law are statutory. They are legislative efforts to take charging 
provisions closer to the subject matter of income taxation. 
Examples include rules to treat hire purchase transactions as 
credit sales or to attribute the income of a controlled foreign 
company to its shareholders who are resident in the 
jurisdiction. The Ralph Report’s recommendation of rollover 
relief for people affected by take-overs is a recommendation 
for an analeptic fiction. In effect, the report says that where 
there is a take-over there is only a legal realisation, not an 
economic realisation and tax should not bite at that point. 
That is, the report says that tax treatment should be brought 
more closely into line with economic reality. The fiction is 
that the legal realisation is ignored. 
On the face of it, these analeptic fictions of income tax law 
look very much like some classic fictions of general law. For 
instance, the fictio Lex Corneliae told Romans to treat a living 
captive as a dead citizen for purposes of testamentary 
succession. In an apparent parallel, for purposes of taxation 
section FC 6 of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1994 treats 
finance leases as if they were sales accompanied by loans. 
On closer examination, the parallel is not exact. The 
Romans had an alternative to the fictio Lex Corneliae. They 
could have simply enacted that the wills of people who lost 
their citizenship because of captivity remained valid. But 
there is no obvious parallel in respect of the tax consequences 
of a finance lease. If the government wants to tax the lease 
according to economic reality it has to tax it as a sale 
accompanied by a loan. The Act achieves that result by 
preferring economic substance to legal substance. Section FC 
6 takes the taxing power of the Act closer to economic reality 
at the cost of employing a fiction in respect of the legal 
relationships that are involved. In contrast, the hypothetical 
alternative to the fictio Lex Corneliae achieves a valid 
testament without resorting to fictions of either law or fact. 
One reason for the difference is that the fictio Lex 
Corneliae was concerned with the law of succession alone, 
whereas section FC 6 is concerned with both tax law and the 
law of leases. Economic reality for tax law is not necessarily 
the same as legal reality for leasing law. It is a characteristic 
of tax law that this kind of problem is always potentially 
present. That is, there are always two different laws 
potentially applicable to any one transaction, namely the law 
of the transaction itself and tax law. 
The comparison of inherent and analeptic fictions within 
tax law prompts two observations. First, I conclude that the 
fictions of income tax are of two kinds, inherent, which relate 
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to fictions of fact, and analeptic, which relate to fictions of 
law. The first arise as a result of the need to have a concept of 
income. The second make tax law work better as an economic 
instrument, but only at the cost of distorting non-tax law.  
The second observation is that it is at first sight curious 
that modern tax legislation uses analeptic fictions to the extent 
that it does, or even at all. After all, fictions are a fairly crude 
and old-fashioned way of reforming the law. Fictions were 
very numerous in Roman law because of the need to appease 
sensitivities of citizens who believed fundamental legal 
precepts were god-given. If a fiction did the job, Roman 
reformers thought it better to work round a fundamental 
precept than to attack it head on and to buy a fight. Fictions 
were very numerous in the common law for another reason: 
because of the need to circumvent the dead hand of the forms 
of action. But nowadays we give superstition short shrift and 
elevate substance above form, with the result that legislative 
drafting favours a plain, transparent, direct style. Fictions 
seem out of place. The reason that fictions remain so 
entrenched in tax law is the reason that I have mentioned so 
often, that tax law is different from other law, and tax law 
reform requires different tools. 
Apologetic, deeming, and expository fictions 
I have considered fictions inherent in tax law and analeptic 
fictions that are employed to improve tax law. I have tried to 
demonstrate that both kinds of fiction are symptoms of the 
underlying malaise of tax law that I have called “ectopia”. 
Nevertheless, some people may point to certain fictions in tax 
law and see that they appear to function much as similar 
fictions function in other areas of law. 
The simplest examples are apologetic fictions, that is, 
explanations for elements in the law that people might 
consider harsh. Examples include, “everyone is presumed to 
know the law” and “the King can do no wrong”.39 Apologetic 
fictions work in the same manner in tax law as anywhere else. 
A second example is the deeming fiction. Drafters use 
deeming fictions for convenience. Suppose that there is 
already a set of rules that deals with the taxation of salaries, 
and suppose that the legislature wants employer-provided 
accommodation to be taxed in the same way. A drafting short 
cut is to deem employer-provided accommodation to be 
salary.40 Deeming fictions are simply a drafting technique and 
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Income Tax Act 1994, s OB 1. 
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tell us nothing about the character of the subject matter to 
which they are applied. 
A third category is the expository fiction.41 An expository 
fiction is ambitious shorthand. The best example is 
“company”. The company is a fiction in the sense that it is not 
a real person, and yet it is a legal person. In another sense, 
“company” is shorthand for a congeries of contracts and state-
created rights and duties that result from investors banding 
together in a manner that complies with relevant legislation. 
Analytically, a company comprises truth rather than fiction, in 
that, given time, one can trace back from the company itself 
through all the formalities that have endowed the company 
with a personality separate from the personalities of its 
shareholders. Nevertheless, it is sometimes more convenient 
to think of a company simply as a disembodied being that is 
fictionally, but effectively, endowed with a legal personality. 
However one cares to look at it, the word, “company”, and 
other expository fictions perform the same role in income tax 
law as they do in the general law. 
I have just described three categories of fiction: apologetic, 
deeming, and expository. It is convenient to call them 
“fictions” in ordinary discourse. But for purposes of the 
present argument I must distinguish them from the pure legal 
fictions that I have been discussing, that is, inherent and 
analeptic fictions; so I’ll call them “quasi fictions”. Strictly 
speaking, what I can call a pure legal fiction is a statement 
that is truly false, whereas these quasi fictions contain within 
themselves their own explanations, so they only appear to be 
false until one examines them closely. Quasi fictions do not 
illuminate the difference between income tax law and general 
law. 
Fictions show tax law is different 
In contrast, pure fictions do illustrate the difference between 
income tax law and other law.  As I explained, where there is 
a true legal fiction in the general law, the law can be reformed 
and can operate directly, without using the fiction. As Fuller 
explained, legal fictions justify themselves by reference to 
social and economic policy. Neither explanation is true of the 
fictions of income tax law. Tax law can operate only by using 
fictions; and these fictions are based not in policy but in the 
pragmatic need to make income tax work. 
Some tax fictions say something false about the underlying 
facts; others say something false about the legal simulacrum 
that lies over the facts. Fuller had some useful observations on 
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this phenomenon, also, though he did not think of the 
particular case of income tax. Fuller said that: 
A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or 
partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement 
recognised as having validity.42 [But] …  
A fiction taken seriously, that is ‘believed’ becomes dangerous 
and loses its utility. It ceases to be a fiction under either 
alternative of the definitions given above.43 …  
[T]he danger of a fiction varies inversely with the acuteness of 
[the] awareness [of its falsity]. A fiction becomes wholly safe 
only when it is used with complete awareness of its falsity.44 
Fuller’s words have an almost uncanny resonance when we 
apply them to income tax law. Windeyer J really did seem to 
think that it made some sort of sense to say that Heavy 
Minerals Pty Ltd was free to go on mining rutile even though 
it could not carry on that business at a profit. To take another 
example, for Lord Wilberforce, Tucker v Granada Motorway 
Services Ltd45 turned on the existence of a lease that was so 
onerous that it could not even be shown as a balance sheet 
asset. As Fuller puts it, the courts “believed” the fiction, yet 
we would all agree that both judgments were right in law. 
Lord Wilberforce put his finger on it when the said that 
there “may not be much commercial difference between a 
payment [to free a taxpayer of a long-term agency agreement, 
which is deductible] and a payment to get rid of an onerous 
lease” which is not.46 He agreed that the test is “to some 
extent arbitrary” but he defended the test on the basis that it 
provides a means which the courts can understand for 
distinguishing capital and income expenditure”. He thought 
the courts “would be wise to maintain it”.47 
If we apply Fuller’s words to the present debate, the courts 
“believe” the fiction of a logically defensible boundary 
between revenue and capital. Fuller would say that the fiction 
is unsafe because the courts employ it with only a partial 
awareness of its falsity. To put words into Fuller’s mouth, the 
fiction is therefore dangerous and has lost its utility. This 
conclusion that I have put into Fuller’s mouth is only partially 
correct. It is correct that the fiction is dangerous, but it is 
wrong to say that it lacks utility. The fiction is dangerous in 
the sense that it leads to decisions that cannot be justified by 
reference to any criterion outside the law. The law can defend 
these decisions only by bootstraps, self-referential arguments. 
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Lord Denning MR put it well in Heather v P-E Consulting 
Group when he said:48 
The question–revenue expenditure or capital expenditure–is a 
question which is being repeatedly asked by men of business, by 
accountants and by lawyers. The difficulty arises because of the 
nature of the question. It assumes that all expenditure can be put 
correctly into one category or the other; but this is simply not 
possible. Some cases lie on the border between the two; and this 
border is not a line clearly marked out; it is a blurred and 
undefined area in which anyone can get lost. Different minds may 
come to different conclusions with equal propriety. It is like the 
border between day and night or the border between red and 
orange. … . In this area, at least, where no decision can be said to 
be right or wrong the only safe rule is to go by precedent. 
This is an unpropitious verdict. It seems to vindicate the 
conclusion that Fuller would draw, that the capital/revenue 
fiction lacks utility. But that conclusion is not correct. The 
problem is that Fuller assumed that law by its nature has a 
close relationship with its subject matter. That is a reasonable 
assumption in general, but it is not true of large areas of 
income tax law. Because income tax law is based on a number 
of false assumptions, it can operate only by using fictions that 
assume that those assumptions are true. Here, oddly enough, 
two wrongs do make a right. This is not to say that income tax 
law is law of high quality as compared to law in general. It 
certainly is not. But if people are to tax income they must 
make shift with whatever law they can construct. 
Let me return to where I started on the discussion of 
fictions. For some years, I have argued that income tax law is 
different from other law in that it is separated from its subject 
matter in a way in which other law is not. One symptom is 
that income tax law employs many fictions. People have 
responded to my thesis by saying that fictions are nothing 
new; law often uses fictions. My rejoinder is that the fictions 
of tax law are different in kind from ordinary legal fictions. 
They are essential to tax law in a way in which ordinary 
fictions are not essential to the general law. Far from showing 
that tax law is similar to the rest of law the fictions of tax law 
vindicate my argument that it is different. 
Consequences of fictions: general anti-avoidance rules 
In a number of articles I have tried to identify various 
consequences that flow from the separation between tax law 
and its subject matter. First, that separation helps to explain 
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why tax law is unduly complex.49 Secondly, it means that 
there is limited scope for simplifying tax laws by re-drafting 
them as principled codes, despite people’s optimism in that 
direction.50 Rowlatt J was right when he said that there is no 
“intendment”51 about a tax; income tax, in particular, is 
structurally not capable of following a logical, thematic 
principle. 
Thirdly, there are some areas of law where ectopia is 
particularly marked. Parliaments typically respond with 
increasingly complex analeptic fictions that are calculated to 
bring tax law and its subject matter closer together. Take, for 
example, rules about source and residence; transfer pricing; 
controlled foreign companies; foreign tax credits; and conduit 
taxation , from the international field.52 
Fourthly, tax law is forever undergoing reform, as 
parliaments try to remedy the results of the fundamental 
defects that this paper has tried to describe. The inexorable 
flow of tax Bills in almost all jurisdictions is too familiar to 
need elaboration. 
Fifthly, the ectopia of tax law leads to the enactment of 
open-ended general anti-avoidance rules like Part IVA of the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and section BG 
1 of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1994.53 Dr Frame has 
very perceptively explained the relationship between cause 
and effect in this context. He focuses on what this article has 
called analeptic fictions, that is, in the context of taxation, 
fictions that tell taxpayers that their transaction X (not 
taxable) will be treated as if it is transaction Y (taxable). But 
Dr Frame’s words apply equally to the inherent fictions of tax 
law. He says:54 
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I should note here two dangers of the fiction as a device for 
preventing the exploitation of legal forms to frustrate the intent of 
legal policy. First, use of the device strengthens the legitimacy 
and likely success of such exploitation in respect of those legal 
forms [that] are not specifically targeted – thus, if legal facts A, B, 
and C are specifically treated as if they were legal fact T 
(Taxable), then by implication legal fact X, which has not been 
designated, is not to be so treated, however artificial its existence 
may appear to be. Secondly, an ever-widening net of fictions may 
end in frustration and a despairing lunge towards legislation of the 
Danzig Decree type promulgated by the Nazi regime in the 1930s: 
“Any person who commits an act which this law deems to be 
punishable or which is deserving of penalty according to the 
fundamental conceptions of penal law and sound popular feeling, 
shall be punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act, 
it shall be punished under the law of which the fundamental 
conception applies most nearly to the said act.” 
The current version of the New Zealand anti-avoidance 
rule, which reads, in effect, “An arrangement that has the 
effect of avoiding tax is void against the Commissioner for 
income tax purposes”,55 is an uncanny echo of the Danzig 
Decree’s “Any …  act which is deserving of penalty …  shall 
be punished”. 
It is for this sort of reason that people often criticise 
general anti-avoidance rules for their lack of specificity. They 
say that the imprecision of anti-avoidance rules erodes the 
rule of law. I am not sure that I agree with that criticism. After 
all, in the end it is the court, not the commissioner, that 
decides whether a general anti-avoidance rule applies. But 
even if the criticism is justified, this characteristic of general 
anti-avoidance rules is part of the price we pay for having a 
tax on income. The concept of income is imprecise; so the 
rules that buttress income taxation must share that 
imprecision. 
The gap between tax law and fact that is the subject of this 
article means that there are perforce gaps in the formal 
coverage of an income tax statute. The statute needs a general, 
substance-over-form rule to protect the tax base. 
In an income tax statute, a general anti-avoidance rule may 
be defended in spite of its parallel with the Danzig Decree. 
There is a distinction between criminal law (the context of the 
Decree) and income tax law. Criminal law both can and 
should be drafted in direct, transparent terms, without fictions. 
Indeed that characteristic of drafting is a quality to be desired 
of all law. But income tax law is constitutionally incapable of 
attaining the desideratum of fictionless transparency. As this 
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article has explained, income tax law is based on inherent 
fictions. 
Income tax presents society with the Siberian dilemma: if 
you go fishing in Siberia and the ice breaks and you fall in 
you have twenty seconds to decide whether you want to 
drown or you prefer to freeze to death when you manage to 
climb out.56 If society decides to have an income tax it has 
two choices. It can allow people to exploit the law’s inherent 
imperfections and avoid tax; or it can minimise exploitation 
by the biggest tax law fiction of them all, a general anti-
avoidance rule. I call such a rule the “biggest fiction” because 
a general anti-avoidance rule treats unspecified, non-taxable, 
transactions as if they were other unspecified, but taxable, 
transactions. Some anti-avoidance rules even give the 
Commissioner specific powers to reconstruct non-taxable 
arrangement X as if it were arrangement Y, and then to tax 
arrangement Y.57 
For people brought up to respect the rule of law and to 
despise the rule of the Nazis the very idea of a general anti-
avoidance rule is anathema. But logic leads us to accept it. 
Society has chosen a tax base that is inherently flawed by 
fictions, a base that the law cannot describe accurately. 
Parliament does its best to repair these defects by enacting 
one analeptic fiction after another, but the task is never 
complete. Moreover, to rephrase Dr Frame’s perceptive 
generalisation, enacting a fiction about one transaction 
inferentially invites taxpayers to switch their attention to a 
surrogate. Parliament may be forgiven for taking the rough 
with the rough: an income tax law without a general anti-
avoidance rule is a law that is not only crippled but that lacks 
crutches. 
These consideration should lead us to reflect on the history 
of general anti-avoidance rules. Often, critics demand 
specificity. Tax commissioners and occasionally Parliaments 
may be sympathetic. They sometimes promulgate guidelines 
or even enact rules to refine the scope of a general rule. In 
principle, that approach is bad practice. The point of a general 
anti-avoidance rule is that it should be general. Specificity, 
however well intentioned, risks eroding the effectiveness of 
the rule. 
                                                  
56 Analogy borrowed from Peter Munz “The Progression of Values, or 
Mankind’s Siberian Dilemma” paper presented at the conference of the 
New Zealand Historical Association, Christchurch, 2 December 2001. 
57 Eg, Income Tax Act 1994, s GB 1 (NZ). 
